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It is often underlined that African oil producing countries are politically unstable as a result
of this natural resource. Based on the data relating to the duration in office of 101 heads of
States exercises of power of 26 African countries (North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa), our
study finds that: this instability does not appear in the executive branch of the state.
Conversly, using survival analysis including non-parametric and parametric estimators, and
controlling for many factors which affect the leader’s tenure, our results suggest a positive
link between oil rents and the duration in office of the leader. While other minerals rents do
not appear to have the same effect. An interpretation of these results is that; oil has a strategic
aspect that other mining products do not have. Hence, no matter what the type of political
regime is in country, the international community is tempted to exert fewer pressures for the
change of the leader in an oil producing State.
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1.  Introduction 
At the end of 2003, Africa held nearly 400 billion of proven oil barrels reserves, which 
are the second greatest reserves of the world, after those of the Middle-East
1. In addition, sub-
Saharan  Africa  is  the  area  of  the  world  with  the  highest  growth  of  oil  production.  The 
production increased by 36% during the last ten years (compared with 16% in the rest of the 
world). In 2005, oil revenues of the eight main oil producers in Sub-Saharan Africa were 
estimated at 35 billions of US dollars (Wurthmann, 2006). Clearly, oil has a major role in 
several economies.  
However, for many scholars in the literature on the “curse” of natural resources, African 
oil has created political instability. Two explanations are provided. First, the presence of a 
natural  resource,  like  oil,  in  a  country  would  provide  motivations  and  means  for  armed 
conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Second, oil rents would weaken the state structure, 
because  leaders  do  not  rely  on  a  solid  social  organization  and  bureaucracy  to  increase 
revenues (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Moreover, oil rents increase the preference for the power; 
therefore there would be a competition for its control and the emergence of authoritarian 
governments (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). Authoritarian governments, which tend to be 
more unstable and transitory (Huntington, 1996).  
Several studies note down the effects of the oil revenues on the type of political regime 
(Ross, 2001; Smith, 2004; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). Other studies, based on individual 
country data, note the relationship between the duration of Middle-East monarchies and oil 
revenues  (Mahdavi,  1970;  Beblawi  and  Luciani,  1987).  Nonetheless,  this  relation  is  not 
subject of empirical test, and what’s more on the African countries. This study attempts to 
address this gap. Based on data relating to the duration in office of heads of States of 26 
African countries (North and Sub-Saharan Africa) during the period 1958-2000, our study 
reveals the presence of a positive and significant relationship between oil revenues and the 
tenure  of  country’s  executive  branch,  suggesting  that  the  political  powers  of  African  oil 
producing States are actually the longest in the continent. This empirical result is consistent 
with the predictions of Ross (2001), and, Jensen and Wantchekon (2004); on the dominance 
of party elite in oil States. However, other metals and minerals countries do not present same 
characteristic. 
In the second section of this article, we present the arguments that could explain longer 
duration of the leader’s tenure in oil States. In the third section, we expose an econometric 
model of the determinants of the tenure of the leader in African States, and, we test the 
assumption of a positive relation between oil rents and the duration in office. The fourth 
section returns in conclusion on the principal results and their implications.  
2.  Theoretical arguments 
One of the recent issues, in the literature of natural resources “curse”, relates to the 
relation between natural resources and political regime. It highlights the interactions between 
the public decision maker and the various groups within population (Lane and Tornell, 1999; 
Ross, 2001; Robinson et al., 2002; Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). To keep the power, the 
decision maker requires a minimum of support. A distribution of oil revenues to particular 
groups of the population is a way to ensure this support to the incumbent. Thus, politically 
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rational strategies consist in providing public goods to particulars groups. The bureaucratic 
and political elites (including local communities), the trade unions of public sector and the 
army  often succeed to  obtain direct  allocation  of public expenditure in exchange of their 
support (Eifert et al., 2003). However, the relationship between oil revenues and the duration 
of the leader’s tenure, which is revealed in this part of literature, is not subject to empirical 
tests. Our study attempts to address this gap. But before this, it is necessary to present the 
possible explanations of the long duration of political regimes in oil African states.  
A  report  from  the  French  national  parliament  underlines:  “Because  of  oil  revenues, 
incumbents  manage  to  preserve  their  tenure  by  using  force  or  corruption”  (Assemblée 
nationale française, 1999; P.156; §2).  
Thus,  oil  revenues  affect  political  sphere,  the  policy  guidelines  are  not  done  on  the 
ideology basis (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004). In absence of an ideological legitimation, the 
political power is legitimated by a principle: the principle of symbolic system exchange. This 
symbolic system exchange is based on a distribution of resources and tends to minimally 
respect the principle of reciprocity: it is the recourse of all forms of social exchange (Medard, 
1991). Oil revenues are monopolized by the agents members or close to the State, they are 
redistributed  in  a  private  way  or  via  clientelism  networks,  and  maintain  an  excessive 
bureaucracy to this end
2(Rosellini, 2005). Technological, institutional and political changes 
are likely to be hampered when they affect the privileges of the incumbent (Acemoglu and 
Robinson,  2006).  Then,  it  becomes  easier  “to  buy”  the  possible  political  challengers 
(Acemoglu et al., 2004).  
The incumbent can also resort to the military force to maintain himself in office. In this 
case, he would tend to invest massively in armed forces, while the country is in a situation of 
non-war that does not justify such investments (Ross, 2001). Taken collectively, governments 
of African States would devote a higher proportion of the revenues drawn from oil production 
to military expenditure (Ngodi, 2005). They prohibit any form of organization, which would 
influence  management,  redistribution  of  the  oil  wealth  when  it  is  likely  to  harm  the 
incumbent’s position. The result is fewer claims for a change of the incumbent.  
Though complementary with the use of repression or corruption, the major explanation 
of the longer duration of political regimes in oil States is the mechanism of rentier State
3. 
Indeed, oil revenues reduce the dependence on taxes not related to oil. They even possibly end 
up replacing the pre-existent tax systems. This releases governments of producing States from 
their obligation of accountability and transparency toward the citizens, which are the ordinary 
counterparts of governments’ right to tax their population (Ngodi, 2005). In fact, oil revenues 
end  up  loosening  the  links  between  population  and  their  leaders.  Therefore,  there  is  less 
demand for a change of political regime (Beblawi and Luciani, 1987).  
 
 
                                                 
2 For example, Gabon has a population 6 times less than Burundi, but Gabonese government is constituted by 42 
members; Burundian Government has 22 members only (see, CIA publication 2006). 
3 The concept of rentier state was introduced at the end of the Sixties by economists who worked on the Middle- 
East and North Africa oil exporting countries; it refers to a State which draws a larger part of its revenues from 
abroad in the form of rents (Mahdavi, 1970).  
   3 
3.  Empirical Design  
To test the effect of oil revenues on the survival of leaders in African countries we have 
recourse to duration models. This modelling appears to be the most appropriate to the study in 
question: the influence of oil revenues on the leader’s tenure in Africa. In this part we intend 
to describe sample and the main variables retained in the study. Finally, we will carry out an 
econometric analysis using non-parametric and parametric approaches.  
3.1 )   Data description 
Because of data availability, our study is limited to 101 occupancies of power in 26 
African countries. The observed period referring to a country is the date of power seizure by 
the leader, for which the duration in office is indexed in the World Bank’s database DPI2000. 
In  duration  models,  the  process  observed  can  have  begun  at  different  dates  for  various 
individuals  present  in  the  sample.  By  construction,  the  observations  are  brought  back  to 
January first of each year. The first period of observation begins in 1958 and corresponds to 
the  presidency  of  the  Tunisian  president  Bourguiba.  The  year  2000  marks  the  end  of  all 
observation periods. 
In our model, we express the duration in office as a function of oil rents. The variables 
oil  rents  and  other  mineral  rents  are  drawn  from  the  database  “World  Bank'  S  Adjusted 
Saving Project” of the World Bank. This database is relatively recent. It has been used in new 
empirical works on the effects related to revenues drawn from natural resources exploitation 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 2005). It pools together separated rents from several mining products 
country by country. As Rosser (2006) pointed out, the main problem of natural resources is 
that they generate rents; these rents lead to various behaviours. In this study, we assume that 
natural  resources  rents  are  used  by  political  elites  to  stay  in  office.  Therefore,  the  most 
relevant way to address this issue is to use a rent-based measure of natural resources.  
3.2 ) Non-parametric approach: kaplan-meier estimator 
In a first analysis, we separate countries of the sample into two groups: oil countries and 
non-oil countries. A country is considered, as an oil country if oil rent variable as previously 
defined is higher than 0, and a non-oil country if it is equal to 0. We obtain a dichotomic 
variable, petrol equal to 1 in the first case and 0 in the second one
4. If oil does not influence 
the leader’s tenure, the survival function curve of the leaders of oil countries and the one of 
non-oil countries should merge.  
In figure 1, we observe that the curve representing the survival function of leaders of oil 
countries is at each time above the one representing the survival function of leaders of non-oil 
countries. This result of Kaplan-Meier estimator demonstrates that leaders of non-oil African 
countries run cumulatively a higher risk of leaving the power than the leaders of oil African 
countries. Thus, one may retain that 60% of the leaders of the non-oil African countries leave 
the power within the first 10 years, while only 45% do so in the oil African countries. In 
addition,  Log-Rank  and  Wilcoxon  tests  (appendix  table  1)  respectively  to  5  and  10% 
thresholds reject the null hypothesis of the equality of the two survival functions.  
                                                 
4 All countries of the sample with positive oil rents, except for Tunisia, are members of the African petroleum 
Producers (APPA). Therefore, we do not find apparent reasons to discuss on the oil character of the countries.  
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In a second analysis, we separate the countries from the sample in two groups according 
to the criterion of other mineral rents. By analogy with the distinction made in the preceding 
paragraph, a country is as mining country if the mineral rents variable is higher than 0 and it is 
a non-mining country if the mineral rents variable is equal to 0. Again we obtain a dichotomic 
variable produitmin, equal to 1 in the first case and 0 in the second one. In contrast with 
figure 1, in figure 2, the survival function curve of the leaders of mining African countries and 
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 Fig 1: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, by petrol
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 Fig 2: Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, by produitmin
 
The estimator of Kaplan-Meier seems to demonstrate that other mining revenues do not 
influence the leader’s tenure. This result is not invalidated by Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests 
(appendix table 2), which do not make it possible to reject the null hypothesis of the equality 
of the two survival functions. In other words, in the African States, mining resources do not 
significantly influence the duration in power of the head of the executive branch. 
From these two analyses, it comes out that, in Africa, oil increases the tenure of the head 
of State, while other mining products do not have any influence on the leader’s tenure. Is this 
result robust to the inclusion of other observable factors, which would influence the leader’s 
tenure? To answer to this question, we resort to parametric analysis.  
3.3)   Parametric approach 
The  parametric  approach  allows  us  to  take  into  account  the  effects  of  various 
explanatory variables. However, it requires a specification of the way in which the covariates 
intervene  and  the  form  of  the  hazard  function.  For  our  study,  we  consider  the  class  of 
accelerated failure time (AFT) model, in this case the explanatory variables intervene in a 
multiplicative  way  over  the  duration,  in  other  words  they  have  an  additive  effect  on  the 
logarithm of the duration. Our model arises in the form:  
( ) Log T X α β σε = + +                        “(1)” 
Where Log (T) the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of years in office. 
X indicates the matrix of covariates including in particular: oil rents (renpetro) and other 
mineral  rents  (rentmin)  as  a  percentage  of  GDP,  past  removal  (passe),  the  regime  type 
(demo),  GDP  per  capita  (lmpib),  the  lagged  real  GDP  growth  (croisretard),  population 
(lmpop), ethnolinguistic fragmentation (fract), the number of spells in office dejpouv. β is 
the vector of the coefficients associated to these various variables, σ is a scale parameter   5 
equal to 1/P. Finally ε is a random variable whose law determines that followed by Log (T) 
being given X.  
The presence of censored data in our sample brings us to the estimation by the maximum 
likelihood method. Indeed, the estimation by ordinary least squares method would provide 
biased  results  (Box-Steffensmeier  and  Jones  2004).  Thus,  two  cases  of  observations  are 
considered as censored in our study. The first case concerns the heads of State, which are still 
in office after the year 2000. The second case concerns the heads of State deceased in office 
following natural causes, to include them as such in the model would amount treating them as 
“political deaths”, which is not relevant (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003).  
In addition, we consider a monotonic hazard function. It is an assumption usually used in 
the survival analysis of the leaders (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), it would like that two 
distinct moments correspond to two different risks. Indeed, intuition may suggest that more a 
tenure lasts, the lower is the risk for leader to leave the power ceteris paribus, in that case one 
would  be  in  the  presence  of  a  monotonically  decreasing  hazard.  Nevertheless,  the  same 
intuition may also suggest that more a tenure lasts, more “l’état de grâce” from which the 
leader benefited at the  beginning erodes,  and the higher the probability  that the leader is 
“dismissed” from his office by the people. In that case one would be in the presence of a 
monotonically increasing hazard. In any of these cases, Weibull modeling is adapted
5.  
Table 3 present the results of three estimations by the maximum likelihood method. Oil 
and other mining rents are considered separately in the estimations exposed in the columns (1) 
and (2). The column (3) exposes an estimation including the two variables. We use three 
different regressions in order to check the robustness of the results. It appears that in the three 
estimations, the overall model is significant and the value of the coefficients as well as the 
level  of  significance  associated  to  oil  rents  variable  (renpetro)  and  other  mineral  rents 
variable  (rentmin)  remain  unchanged.  The  marginal  value  of  the  coefficients  cannot  be 
interpreted in the metric with which they are given; only the associated signs are interpretable. 
A positive sign of the coefficient implies a positive effect of the variable considered on the 
duration of the tenure of the leader or, equivalently, a negative effect on the risk of exit at 
each period.  
Thus,  the  coefficient  associated  to  the  interest  covariate  (renpetro)  is  positive  and 
significant,  which  suggests  that  oil  rents  increase  the  tenure  of  the  leader  as  assumed  in 
assumption in the theoretical analysis. The coefficient associated to the other mineral rents 
variable (rentmin) is negative but non-significant, suggesting that rents of the other mining 
products do not significantly influence the duration in office of the heads of State considered. 
An interpretation of these results is that oil requires massive financial investments and 
considerable  production  technology.  To  ensure  the  profitability  of  these  investments, 
investors are tempted to give their supports to political leaders with which the contracts were 
negotiated, reducing thereby the risk of loosing the property rights that could occur with a 
change  of  the  executive  branch  of  the  state.  In  addition,  the  tensions on  oil  international 
market  have  global  repercussions.  Therefore  oil  has  a  strategic  aspect  that  other  mining 
                                                 
5 Moreover, the choice of this functional form is validated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).The 
estimate with functional form Weibull reveals the statistic AIC = 138,09; quite lower than those revealed using 
other functional forms alternatively met in the literature: AIC = 210, 32 for the exponential; AIC = 145,84 for 
the Lognormal;    AIC = 151,5 for the Log-Logistic. 
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products do not have. Hence, no matter what the type of political regime is in country, the 
international community is tempted to exert fewer pressures for the change of the leader in an 
oil producing State. 
 In addition, one can note the positive influence of the economic variables (lmpib and 
croisretard) on the leader’s tenure. This means that better living conditions in a country are 
reduce claims for a change of the executive power. It is also noted thate there is a negative 
influence of ethnolinguistic fragmentation (fract) and past removals (passe). This means that 
strongly fragmented population is harder to maintain under the control of the head of the 
executive. In the same way, the changes in executive power intervened in the recent past of a 
country increase the probability of this country changing executive power again. The absence 
of influence of political regime type (demo), can be related to the fact that the majority of the 
African countries transited to the democratic era lately in the beginning of the Nineties, for 
this reason, the democracy is still in consolidation (Block, 2002). In the same way, we do not 
find a significant relation between the size of the population (lmpop), the number of spells in 
office (dejpouv), and the duration of the leader’s tenure. Although, the signs of the associated 
coefficients are as expected by the theory. 
Lastly,  it  appears  that  the  value  of σ  estimated  by  the  maximum  likelihood  is  0,37 
implying p>1. This suggests that hazard rate is monotonically increasing, in other words for 




4.  Conclusion 
The African oil States are often viewed as politically unstable. This political instability would 
be due to the presence of oil resources. Our study finds that: this instability does not appear in 
the executive branch of the State. On contrary, oil causes stability of the political power. 
Given the mechanisms that underlie this result, it is very likely that this political characteristic 
does not contribute to the population’s wellbeing or development in the States concerned. 
These mechanisms enable however to emphasize that the behaviour of public decision makers 
of  oil  African  States  fall  under  the  logic  of  those  their  counterparts  of  Persian  Gulf. 
Nevertheless, for African countries, the mechanisms associated with oil rents deserve further 
research in order to clarify the behaviour of repressive, clientelism and rentier States. 
In addition, our study arises the need for a disaggregated analysis of natural resources. 
Indeed,  our  econometric  results  demonstrate  that  other  mining  products  do  not  have  an 
influence on the tenure of the leaders in the States considered, suggesting that the effects of 
natural  resources  on  the  variables  can  differ  depending  on  the  type  of  natural  resource. 
Consequently, it would be relevant to analyze natural resources separately in order to give the 
most appropriate political and economic recommendation.  
 
                                                 
6 We confront our results to alternative reasoning to our model (sensitive analysis). For this purpose, we 
evaluate these results successively controlling for unobserved heterogeneity; excluding countries which were not 
oil producing countries at the date of their entrance in the sample; and finally excluding the set of oil countries in 
an analysis of mining countries.  All these analyses (estimations not reported) confirm the conclusions of the 
preceding estimations. 
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Furthermore,  our  results  suggest  that  many  efforts  aiming  at  a  process  of 
democratization in Africa are likely to be useless if the preliminary condition is neglected: it 
is essential to increase the transparency in the use of oil revenues, and to install a suitable 
framework that would prevent the public decision makers from absorbing the revenue. Here 
appears  a  fundamental  role  for  the  multilateral  organizations  that  have  the  capacity  to 
influence the behaviours of the African governments. However, the actions of multilateral 
organization  should  be  combined  with  those  of  civil  society,  since  public  awareness  is 
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Table 1 : Test test for equality of survivor functions by petrol 
  Log-rank Test    Wilcoxon Test 









0  59  50.27  chi2(1) = 5. 53**    59  50.27  chi2(1) = 2. 87* 




Table 2: Test test for equality of survivor functions by produitmin 
  Log-rank Test    Wilcoxon Test 









0  23  19.65  chi2(1) = 0. 87    23  19.65  chi2(1) = 0. 68 
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Table 3 : Results 
Dependent variable Log (T)   
Covariates 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Renpetro  0.010    0.010 
  (0.005)**    (0.005)** 
       
Rentmin    -0.005  -0.003 
    (0.010)  (0.010) 
       
Passe  -1.694  -1.707  -1.693 
  (0.083)***  (0.083)***  (0.083)*** 
       
Lmpib  0.141  0.170  0.142 
  (0.063)**  (0.069)**  (0.063)** 
       
Lmpop  -0.005  -0.001  -0.005 
  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
       
Demo  0.003  -0.003  0.002 
  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
       
Fract  -0.374  -0.239  -0.371 
  (0.207)*  (0.202)  (0.208)* 
       
Croisretard  0.013  0.012  0.013 
  (0.006)**  (0.006)**  (0.006)** 
       
Dejpouv  0.108  0.100  0.103 
  (0.116)  (0.136)  (0.116) 
       
Constant  3.045  2.944  3.048 
  (0.175)***  (0.169)***  (0.175)*** 
       
Observations  101  101  101 
Log-likelihood  -58.1186  -59.9371  -58.0454 
Wald Test   522.79***  500.83***  535.64*** 
1/P  0.375587  0.38559  0.3756867 
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 Table 4:  Covariates definition and sources 
  Variables  Definition  Sources 
rentpetro; rentmin  Oil rents ; other mineral rent 
as a percentage of GDP 
 
The  calculation  of  natural 
resources  rents  is  described 
in Bolt et al. (2002) 
Lmpib  GDP  per  capita  in  constant 
dollars 2000 
Croisretard  lagged real GDP growth 
Lmpop  size of  population 
 
World development indicator 
 2005 
Fract  Ethnolinguistic 
fragmentation: considered as 
the  probability  that  two 
individuals  taken  randomly 
in  a  given  country  do  not 
belong  to  the  same 
ethnolinguistic  group 
(Easterly and Livine, 1997) 
Alesina  A.,  Devleeschauwer 
A.,  Easterly  W.,  Kurlat 
S.,Wacziarg R.(2003) 
Demo  The regime type  Polity  IV  database  of 
Marshall and Jaggers (2002) 
Dejpouv  The  number  of  spells  in 
office 
Derived  from  Archigos 
database  of  Chiozza, 
Goemans  and  Cleditsch 
(2006) 
Passe  The past removals (passe) are 
taken into account through a 
dichotomic  variable,  which 
takes  the  value  of  1  if  the 
country  knew  a  change  of 
regime  in  the  five  years 
preceding  the  completion 
date  of  a  spell  and  0 
otherwise 
Author’s  construction  based 
on  DPI2000  world  bank’s 
database. 
 